Counter-UAS Without Jamming: Critical-Infrastructure Vendors and the Legal Map (EU and US, 2026)

Critical-infrastructure sites that cannot jam — in the US, the UK and most of the EU that means every private operator — build counter-drone protection from two parts: detection they own (radar, RF sensing, electro-optical/infrared cameras, acoustic arrays, Remote ID) and mitigation that does not rely on broadband jamming (cyber takeover of the drone's control link, net-capture interceptors and launchers, and, on military sites, high-power microwave). "Without jamming" does not mean "without legal limits": in most jurisdictions, taking control of or bringing down a drone is still reserved to authorised agencies. So the operator's realistic job is to detect, document and hand over — and to choose vendors whose mitigation layer the authorities can run.

This guide maps the options, the law in the US and the EU's main markets, and 16 vendors.

Disclosure: Dronehub led AUDROS, a counter-UAS R&D programme co-funded by the European Space Agency and the European Defence Agency that developed a net-capture interceptor. It appears in the vendor table as an R&D reference. The table is grouped by layer, not ranked.

Why jamming is off the table

United States. The FCC says federal law prohibits the operation, marketing or sale of jamming equipment that interferes with authorised radio communications, with no exemption for use within a business; federal law enforcement may use jammers only in limited cases. Since July 2026, state and local agencies certified under the SAFER SKIES Act may also use authorised mitigation systems, subject to FCC authorisation. Private operators may not.

United Kingdom. Section 68 of the Wireless Telegraphy Act 2006 makes it an offence to use apparatus to interfere with wireless telegraphy, punishable by up to two years in prison.

European Union. Jamming is governed by national telecoms and police law, and in practice reserved to the state. Law firm Bird & Bird, analysing the Commission's 2026 action plan, notes that generally "neither the private sector nor critical infrastructure operators have legal authority to take positive action to disable a malicious drone."

Poland is the exception. The Act of 29 May 2026 (Dz.U. 2026 poz. 815), in force since 4 July 2026 and implementing the EU's critical-entities resilience directive, adds Article 6zj to the Crisis Management Act. A critical-infrastructure operator that has notified the interior minister, the telecoms regulator UKE and the military frequency-management unit may, in the drone-threat cases the law lists, allow staff of specialised armed security formations to use devices that block telecommunications for the time necessary. It must report each use at once, and the interior or defence minister can order it to stop. It is a narrow, procedural permission — not a licence to jam at will.

Jamming also has technical limits against drones that fly pre-programmed routes, which our counter-UAS methods comparison covers. The rest of this guide assumes jamming is not available to you.

Detection: the layer operators own

The legal notes come from the 2020 US interagency advisory issued by the Justice Department, DHS, the FAA and the FCC. It warns critical-infrastructure owners and operators that federal laws may prevent, limit or penalise the sale, possession or use of detection and mitigation tools, and it separates systems that reflect energy off an object — radar, EO/IR, acoustic — from RF systems that intercept the drone's communications. No single sensor covers every case, so serious sites combine at least radar and RF with camera verification.

Mitigation without jamming

Two legal points apply to every row. The US advisory lists nets and projectiles, and hacking and spoofing, among the techniques that may implicate federal laws protecting aircraft, computers and communications. And bringing a drone down intact — in a net, or by landing it through a cyber takeover — also preserves evidence for investigators, which matters when the goal is attribution rather than only stopping one flight. Our net-capture explainer covers the engineering side.

The legal map in 2026

United States. The SAFER SKIES Act, signed on 18 December 2025 in the FY2026 NDAA, lets trained and certified state, local, tribal and territorial law-enforcement and correctional agencies conduct counter-UAS operations, including to protect critical infrastructure. The Justice Department and DHS put it into effect with an interim final rule from 1 July 2026, with a two-tier certification for detection-and-warning and for mitigation operations. The authority is given to agency officers and employees, not to private operators — so the practical change for a utility or refinery is that the local police may now be the ones who can respond.

Germany. The amended Aviation Security Act, in force since 17 March 2026, lets the armed forces assist the police against drones — as a last resort with armed force — and moves the decision to the Defence Ministry. A Federal Police Act reform that gives the Federal Police powers against dangerous drones passed the Bundestag on 25 September 2026. Operators have little room: the Bundestag noted in February 2026 that critical-infrastructure operators have no explicit legal basis to detect or counter drones, and asked the government to examine one. A German security-services firm's summary puts current practice plainly: private parties may detect and document, but may not intercept, jam or destroy drones.

Poland. Article 6zj adds jamming to powers Polish security staff already had: under Article 156ze of the Aviation Law, staff of specialised armed security formations — alongside the police and other services — may destroy, immobilise or take control of a drone that threatens a protected site, and the 2026 Act extends these powers to unmanned vessels and ground vehicles. Military air defence runs separately: the Armaments Agency signed the SAN counter-drone programme with a PGZ–Kongsberg consortium in January 2026, worth about PLN 15 billion, with APS supplying radars and the command system; and the US-made MEROPS interceptor system has been delivered to Poland and Romania. Those are armed-forces tools, not site-operator products.

EU level. The Commission's Action Plan on Drone and Counter-Drone Security, published on 11 February 2026, focuses on preparedness, detection capacity, coordinated response and defence readiness. Bird & Bird reads it as recommending voluntary performance standards for counter-UAS systems by the end of 2026 and aiming for an EU-level regulatory framework by 2030.

Vendors compared

How we chose them: each sells detection or mitigation relevant to fixed critical-infrastructure or defended sites and describes that capability on its own website. The table is grouped by layer — detection first, then mitigation — and is not a ranking.

Where Dronehub fits

AUDROS is an autonomous counter-UAS and public-safety system developed by a consortium Dronehub led, co-funded by the European Space Agency and the European Defence Agency. Its net-capture interceptor, Eagle One, came from consortium partner Fly4Future in the Czech Republic and was tested with the Military Technical Institute and the Military Research Institute in Brno. We list it for completeness, as an R&D reference for net capture that brings a drone down intact. The legal map above applies to it like everyone else.

A buyer's checklist for critical-infrastructure operators

1. Start with the law, per site. Map what you may detect, what you may record, and who is authorised to mitigate — federal and certified local agencies in the US, police in most EU states, and armed security formations at protected sites in Poland.
2. Buy detection you own. Combine at least radar and RF sensing with camera verification, and test false-alarm rates on your site, with its birds, traffic and industrial noise.
3. Get RF detection reviewed. In the US, systems that capture drone-to-controller communications can raise Wiretap Act and Pen/Trap issues.
4. Design the handover. Agree with the police or authorised agency how alerts reach them, what evidence you record, and where their mitigation equipment could operate on your site.
5. Integrate with security operations. Alerts belong in your control room and video systems, not in a separate screen nobody watches.
6. Check the supply chain. Ask where sensors and software are made and where data is processed; public funding and tenders increasingly ask the same.
7. Watch the standards. Bird & Bird expects EU voluntary performance standards for counter-UAS systems by the end of 2026; use them in tenders when they arrive.

For the wider picture, read counter-UAS methods compared and how European Defence Fund counter-UAS calls work.